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We analyze the eﬀect of changes in fertility and longevity on taxes, the com-
position of government spending, and productivity. To that purpose, we introduce
politics in an OLG economy with endogenous growth due to human and physical
capital accumulation. Population ageing shifts political power from students and
workers to retirees, leading to a reallocation of resources from education spending
to retirement beneﬁts and a slowdown of productivity growth. Calibrated to U.S.
data, the closed-form solutions of the model predict retirement beneﬁts as a share
of GDP to strongly increase over the next decades and the education share to fall.
This eﬀect depresses the annual productivity growth rate by 10 basis points. In
spite of higher labor-income taxes, per-capita labor supply is predicted to rise, as a
consequence of increased life expectancy. The equilibrium allocation is consumption
and production eﬃcient, but the political process allocates a much smaller share of
resources to eduction than a Ramsey planner with balanced welfare weights.
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11 Introduction
The prospect of “graying” populations in many developed economies raises concerns about
the sustainability of ﬁscal policies. Rising old-age dependency ratios threaten to translate
into growing tax burdens and thus, to depress economic activity. At the same time, gener-
ous pension and health care beneﬁts threaten to crowd out public investment spending, for
instance for education, with negative eﬀects on productivity growth. Recent experience
suggests that such concerns may be warranted. In the United States, for example, govern-
ment spending on the elderly grew much faster during the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury than other components of government spending (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 2004);
the quality of public infrastructure is deemed poor and public spending on infrastruc-
ture insuﬃcient (American Society of Civil Engineers, 2005); and the fraction of elderly
residents is negatively associated with education spending per child (Poterba, 1997).
In this paper, we develop a tractable framework to analyze the structure of government
budgets in politico-economic equilibrium as well as the macroeconomic implications of
this structure. We apply the framework to study the eﬀect of the projected demographic
transition—decreasing fertility and increasing longevity—on taxes, the composition of
government spending, and productivity, focusing on two spending categories—transfers
between workers and retirees, and public expenditures for education—that are of cen-
tral importance for developed economies (accounting for nearly one half of public sector
spending in the United States).
Building on a standard three-period overlapping generations model with physical and
human capital, our framework endogenizes a number of political and economic choices.
In their role as economic agents, households in the model take prices, taxes, education
spending and retirement beneﬁts as given when choosing consumption, savings, and labor
supply. As voters, households choose among oﬃce motivated parties that oﬀer policy
platforms comprising labor and capital income taxes as well as the expenditure shares for
inter-generational transfers and public education. Elections take place every period. As
a consequence, the political process lacks commitment.
In this environment, the ﬁnancing of government expenditures has negative eﬀects on
growth because labor and capital income taxes depress disposable income and reduce the
incentive to accumulate capital. The composition of government spending also aﬀects the
growth rate, in line with empirical evidence (see, for example, Blankenau, Simpson and
Tomljanovich, 2007). While transfers to retirees lower the incentive to save and further
depress growth, public education expenditure fosters human capital accumulation and
thus, future productivity.
Fiscal policy choices are of diﬀerent concern to the diﬀerent cohorts. On the one hand,
the exposure of agents to capital and labor income taxes changes over the life cycle. On
the other hand, retirees beneﬁt from transfers to their group, while students and workers
beneﬁt from the eﬀect of education spending on human capital and thus, future returns
to labor and capital. When evaluating the policy platforms on oﬀer in the political arena,
the diﬀerent groups of voters therefore disagree as to which platform should ideally be
implemented. We model the resolution of the ensuing conﬂict under the assumption of
probabilistic voting, representing electoral competition under the presumption that voters’
2support for a party is subject to a small degree of randomness. This randomness induces
a continuous mapping from parties’ electoral platforms to vote shares, in contrast with
the discontinuous mapping that arises under the more common assumption of a pivotal
median voter. As a consequence, the probabilistic-voting assumption allows to capture
gradual adjustments of policy in response to changes in the economic or demographic
environment, even in a stylized three-period-lived overlapping-generations environment.
Tax rates and spending shares do not only aﬀect human and physical capital accumu-
lation, factor prices, and incomes. Absent commitment, they also aﬀect, indirectly, future
policy outcomes. In addition to the “economic” repercussions of their policy choices, vot-
ers therefore have to internalize the “political” repercussions. In particular, voters must
account for the equilibrium relationship between future state variables and policy choices.
We assume that only fundamental state variables enter this equilibrium relationship, ex-
cluding artiﬁcial state variables of the type sustaining trigger strategy equilibria. This
restriction absolves us from having to make arbitrary assumptions about the strategies
being played; it also reﬂects our assumption that political choices suﬀer from a lack of
commitment, including commitment to particular enforcement strategies. While we agree
that the existence of intergenerational transfers or public education may also owe to rep-
utational arrangements, we focus on the Markov perfect equilibrium in order to identify
the fundamental and robust forces that shape the size of these programs.1
Under standard functional form assumptions, we are able to characterize the politico-
economic equilibrium in closed form. The optimal strategy of the vote-seeking parties
is to propose a policy platform maximizing a weighted average of the welfare of all vot-
ers. Since retirees favor old-age transfers while students and workers favor at least some
education spending, the political process typically sustains both types of expenditures.
Changes in the demographic structure aﬀect the equilibrium allocation both directly and
indirectly, by altering the balance of power and thus, policy choices. With population
ageing, the politico-economic equilibrium features increasingly large budget shares ﬂow-
ing into intergenerational transfers and a decline of the budget share devoted to public
education, in line with notions voiced in the public debate. The politico-economic equi-
librium generically diﬀers from the allocation implemented by a Ramsey planner with
(arbitrary) geometric social welfare weights. Nevertheless, for a set of parameters with
positive measure (including all parameterizations considered in the quantitative analysis),
the allocation implemented in politico-economic equilibrium is consumption and produc-
tion eﬃcient.
To assess the quantitative implications of the model, we calibrate it to U.S. data,
matching growth and interest rates as well as budget shares in selected years. Feeding
historical and forecasted values for fertility and longevity into the model, we derive pre-
dictions for tax rates, government spending shares, labor supply, and productivity growth
between 1975 and 2075. The model does a good job at ﬁtting the historical trends. Out
of sample, it predicts that the population ageing over the next decades will lead to an
increase of the GDP share of retirement beneﬁts by more than ﬁfty percent, accompanied
by a fall of the education share. In spite of higher tax rates, labor supply is predicted to
1For a discussion of Markov perfect equilibrium see, for example, Krusell, Quadrini and R´ ıos-Rull
(1997).
3rise, due to higher life expectancy. After the completion of the demographic transition,
the model-implied annual productivity growth falls ten basis points short of the level that
would prevail if tax rates and spending shares were at their current values.
Using the calibrated parameter values, we also compute the Ramsey policy under the
assumption that welfare weights reﬂect population growth and households’ time prefer-
ence. We ﬁnd that the Ramsey policy calls for a labor-income tax rate close to or even
higher than the actual one, but sustains a much higher budget share for education spend-
ing and a much lower share for transfers. This holds true even if dynamic human capital
externalities are weak such that growth is exogenous. With endogenous growth, pro-
ductivity grows substantially faster under the Ramsey policy than in politico-economic
equilibrium.
These ﬁndings have important policy implications. On the one hand, they undermine
the notion among many policy makers that the political process will implement measures
to boost productivity in order to “outgrow” the burden imposed by population ageing.2
According to the model, the political process rather will do the opposite, by reallocating
resources from productive use to transfers; productivity growth will only be sustained (or
even strengthened) because the slowdown in population growth reduces the usual capital
dilution eﬀect. On the other hand, the analysis of the benchmark Ramsey allocation
points to potentially large welfare costs (if measured by a utilitarian social welfare func-
tion), due to the comparatively low education spending in politico-economic equilibrium.
Unlike in Bassetto and Sargent (2006) (who assume commitment), this “underinvest-
ment” problem cannot be overcome by letting voters ﬁnance investment expenditures out
of government debt. For the lack of commitment in our setting implies that the economic
equivalence between intergenerational transfers and certain debt-plus-tax policies extends
to the political sphere such that the equilibrium allocations with and without government
debt coincide.3
We are not the ﬁrst ones to incorporate politics in an overlapping-generations model
to analyze the choice of productive and redistributive public spending. Bellettini and
Berti Ceroni (1999) and Rangel (2003) show how societies may sustain public investment
(e.g., education) even if the interests of those beneﬁting from the investment are not
represented in the political process. In both papers, voters support public investment
because a trigger strategy links investment spending to the provision of public pensions
by future cohorts. Our model adopts a diﬀerent perspective. Rather than emphasizing
complementarities between investment and transfer payments, it focuses on the conﬂict
over the size of these two spending components, and how the resolution of this conﬂict
is shaped by fertility and life expectancy. The model also diﬀers from previous literature
in that it features various economic choices, embedded in the standard growth model, in
addition to the political choices of central interest. This allows us to adopt a quantitative
approach to evaluating the consequences of population ageing without having to sacriﬁce
analytical tractability.4
2See, for example, the report in The Economist, October 20, 2005, or the discussions surrounding the
European Union’s “Lisbon Agenda.”
3See Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2007).
4In Bellettini and Berti Ceroni (1999), population ageing triggers a decrease of both public investment
4Our work also relates to politico-economic models of redistribution and growth. For
example, Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Krusell et al. (1997)
argue that inequality depresses growth because anticipated redistributive taxation reduces
the incentive to accumulate, or because higher inequality pushes the median voter’s pre-
ferred level of public investment and taxes beyond the growth-maximizing level. Relative
to these papers, we model inter- rather than intragenerational conﬂict and we consider a
larger set of policy instruments available to policy makers. Our analysis therefore sheds
light on the equilibrium size and composition of the government’s budget, both on the
ﬁnancing and the spending side.5 Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Perotti (1993) also
analyze distributive conﬂict in models with human capital accumulation. They focus on
the political choice of public versus private education and the eﬀect of distortive redistri-
bution in the presence of borrowing constraints, respectively.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model
and characterizes the allocation conditional on policy. Section 3 solves for the politico-
economic equilibrium and analyzes its eﬃciency properties. Section 4 contains the quan-
titative analysis, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Economic Environment
We consider an economy inhabited by three overlapping generations: students, workers,
and retirees. Students accumulate human capital but do not consume nor work. Workers
contribute with their acquired human capital to production and the formation of new
human capital, and save for retirement. With probability pt, workers in period t − 1
survive to become retirees in period t. Retirees do not work and die at the end of the
period.
Each cohort consists of a continuum of homogeneous agents. The ratio of workers to
retirees in period t equals νt/pt which follows a deterministic process. The period-t ratio
of students to workers equals νt+1. On a balanced growth path, the survival probability
is constant at value p and the gross population growth rate is given by ν.
Savings of workers who die before reaching retirement age are distributed among
their surviving peers (reﬂecting an annuities market) and among the members of the
following cohort (reﬂecting accidental bequests). The parameter f measures the fraction
of retirement savings that is annuitized while 1−f measures the importance of accidental
bequests.6
and transfers. In Rangel (2003), within some limits, population ageing increases public investment.
5Our work shares with Krusell et al. (1997) the restriction to Markov perfect equilibrium. Method-
ologically, it is related to Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2008).
6Since bequests are distributed equally among workers (for example, because workers insure each
other), there is no wealth heterogeneity within cohorts.
52.1 Technology
A continuum of competitive ﬁrms transforms capital and labor into output by means of
a Cobb-Douglas technology. Output per worker in period t is given by
B0k
α
t [Ht(1 − xt)]
1−α,
where B0 > 0 and the capital share α ∈ (0,1). Capital is owned by retirees and fully
depreciates after one period. The capital stock per worker, kt, therefore corresponds to
the per-capita savings of workers in the previous period, st−1, normalized by νt. Labor is
supplied by workers whose productivity is given by their human capital, Ht. We normalize
the time-endowment of a worker to unity and denote workers’ leisure consumption by xt.
Production factors are paid their marginal products, due to perfect competition. The
wage per unit of time, wt, and the gross return on physical capital, Rt, therefore satisfy
















with α′ ≡ α/(1−α). As a consequence of the (incomplete) annuitization, the gross return
on savings of a worker that survives to retirement equals ˜ Rt ≡ Rt(1 + (1 − pt)f/pt) =
Rt(1 − f + f/pt). With perfect annuities markets, the gross return equals Rt/pt.
Human capital reﬂects investments in education during previous periods. More specif-







with δ ∈ (0,1) and It denoting education investment per student. This human capital
accumulation speciﬁcation is standard in the literature.7 Most of the analysis will be
conducted under the assumption that ε = 1. However, to check whether the endogenous
growth assumption is crucial for the model predictions, we also consider the possibility
that 0 ≤ ε < 1.
As far as the speciﬁcation of B1,t is concerned, it is useful to consider the limiting
case of δ = 0. The equation then postulates that Hε
t and Ht+1 are proportional to each
other, with the factor of proportionality being given by B1,t. If the acquisition of human
capital is non-rival, then B1,t is independent of the ratio of workers to students. If the
acquisition is rival, in contrast, then B1,t is aﬀected by this ratio. In particular, in the
rival case, it is reasonable to assume that B1,t = ˜ B1ν
−ε
t+1 for some fundamental constant
˜ B1 such that Ht+1 = ˜ B1(Ht/νt+1)ε. In the following, we allow for both cases, considering
two speciﬁcations of B1,t. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, B1,t is ﬁxed or, if ε < 1, growing at
some exogenous rate independent of demographics. In the second speciﬁcation, B1,t =
˜ B1ν
−ε(1−δ)
t+1 . The distinction between the two speciﬁcations is irrelevant for most model
predictions, but it matters for the growth implications of the demographic transition.
7For example, Boldrin and Montes (2005) use the above speciﬁcation, subject to ε = 1, to compare
the allocation in an economy with complete markets for private education ﬁnancing to the one in an
economy without these markets, but with public education and pensions.
62.2 Government
The government taxes labor income in period t at rate τt+σt and capital income at rate ηt.
Revenues collected from workers fund transfers to retirees (the component corresponding
to τt) as well as education investment (the component corresponding to σt). Revenues
collected from retirees fund transfers to workers. Denoting the transfer to workers (per
worker) by at and the transfer to retirees (per retiree) by bt, we have
at = st−1 ˜ Rtηtpt/νt,
bt = wt(1 − xt)τtνt/pt,
It = wt(1 − xt)σt/νt+1.
Public investment It as well as the transfer payments at and bt must be non-negative.
(We exclude lump-sum taxes.) The policy instruments therefore have to satisfy
τt,σt,ηt ≥ 0 for all t. (1)
We denote a combination of the three instruments in period t by κt, κt ≡ (τt,σt,ηt).
2.3 Preferences
As mentioned before, students do not work nor consume. Workers value consumption
during working-age, c1, and retirement, c2, as well as leisure. They discount the future
at factor β ∈ (0,1). Due to the risk of death, workers’ eﬀective discount factor therefore
equals βpt+1. For analytical tractability, we assume that the period utility function of




ln(c1,t) + v(xt) + βpt+1 ln(c2,t+1)
s.t. c1,t = wt(1 − xt)(1 − τt − σt) + at − st + st−1Rt(1 − pt)(1 − f)/νt,
c2,t+1 = st ˜ Rt+1(1 − ηt+1) + bt+1,
where the last term in the ﬁrst constraint reﬂects accidental bequests. The felicity function
of leisure is assumed to be increasing and concave.
The ﬁrst-order conditions characterizing the households’ savings and labor-supply de-
cisions are standard. Conditional on factor prices, tax rates, and transfers, the marginal
rate of substitution between current and expected future consumption is equalized with
the corresponding marginal rate of transformation, the after-tax gross interest rate. Simi-













7Substituting the expressions for at and bt+1, the Euler equation characterizing the
optimal savings choice of an individual household yields a closed-form solution for the
aggregate savings function:8
st = zt+1(τt+1,ηt+1)wt(1 − xt)(1 − τt − σt + φt(ηt)),
where we deﬁne the aggregate savings rate
zt+1(τt+1,ηt+1) ≡
αβp2
t+1(1 − f + f/pt+1)(1 − ηt+1)
α(pt+1 + βp2




′(ηtpt(1 − f + f/pt) + (1 − pt)(1 − f)).
Note that the savings rate depends on subsequent tax rates. (If τt+1 > 0, retirees receive
retirement beneﬁts in addition to the return on their savings. This renders the savings
rate endogenous, even with logarithmic preferences.) If these tax rates themselves depend
on aggregate savings, then the above relation characterizes savings only implicitly. We
will return to this point in Section 3.
2.4 Economic Equilibrium
The endogenous state variables at time t are Ht and kt. To simplify notation, we work
with the state variables Ht and qt ≡ H
1−α
t kα
t instead. Combining kt = st−1/νt and
the aggregate savings function with the dynamic budget constraint and the expressions
for factor prices, the equilibrium allocation can recursively be expressed in terms of the
following functions of policy instruments:
kt+1 = Lt (1 − τt − σt + φt(ηt)) zt+1(τt+1,ηt+1)/νt+1 = st/νt+1,
c1,t = Lt (1 − τt − σt + φt(ηt)) (1 − zt+1(τt+1,ηt+1)),
c2,t = Lt νtα′
 

















(Lt (1 − τt − σt + φt(ηt)) zt+1(τt+1,ηt+1)/νt+1)
α .

          
          
(2)
8The optimal savings choice of a worker is characterized by the condition
st ˜ Rt+1(1−ηt+1)+bt+1 = βpt+1 ˜ Rt+1(1−ηt+1)[wt(1−xt)(1−τt−σt)+at−st+st−1Rt(1−pt)(1−f)/νt],
implying
st ˜ Rt+1(1 − ηt+1) + bt+1
βpt+1 ˜ Rt+1(1 − ηt+1)
= wt(1 − xt)(1 − τt − σt + α′[ηtpt(1 − f + f/pt) + (1 − pt)(1 − f)]) − st.
Simplifying the left-hand side of this equation and setting individual and average savings equal to each
other, we arrive at the speciﬁed expression.
8Here, the variable Lt denotes labor income, and the function xt( ) is implicitly deﬁned by
the transformed ﬁrst-order condition characterizing labor supply,
Lt ≡ B0(1 − α)qt(1 − xt)
1−α = wt(1 − xt),
v
′(xt)(1 − xt)(1 − zt+1(τt+1,ηt+1)) =
1 − τt − σt
1 − τt − σt + φt(ηt)
. (3)
Note that labor supply in period t is independent of τt and σt if φt(ηt) = 0, i.e., if workers
neither receive government transfers nor accidental bequests. In this case, income and
substitution eﬀects cancel.
Conditional on initial values for the two endogenous state variables, (H0,q0), as well
as a sequence of policy instruments, {κt}∞
t=0, conditions (2) and (3) fully characterize the
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ε(1 − α)(1 − δ) α + δ(1 − α)
 














      
mt
(4)
where the deﬁnitions of mH
t (xt( ),σt) and m
q
t(xt( ),τt,σt,ηt,τt+1,ηt+1) follow from the laws
of motion in (2).
In the special case of inelastic labor supply, v′(x) = 0, xt = 0, and the equilibrium
conditions (2) maintain their validity while equation (3) becomes irrelevant.
2.5 Balanced Growth Path
Along a balanced growth path, all tax rates and demographic variables are constant,
implying that per-capita labor supply is time-invariant as well. From (2), the growth
rates of kt,st,c1,t, and c2,t then are equal to the growth rate of qt.
If ε = 1, the economy displays endogenous growth. The laws of motion for the two
state variables in (2) then imply that, along a balanced growth path, the gross growth rate
of Ht, γH, equals the gross growth rate of qt. For any time-invariant choice of tax rates,
the last two equations in (2) therefore pin down the ratio Ht/qt on the corresponding
balanced growth path. Given this ratio, the same two conditions pin down γH and thus,
the balanced growth rates of qt,kt,st,c1,t, and c2,t. Following this logic, we ﬁnd
γH =
  











As this equation makes clear, labor income taxes depress growth because they lower
disposable income of workers (the eﬀect captured by the expression 1 − τ − σ + φ(η)),
as do expected future retirement beneﬁts because they lower the savings rate (z(τ,η) is
decreasing in its ﬁrst argument).9 At the same time, education investment fosters human
9Accidental bequests increase the disposable income of workers and thus, growth.
9capital accumulation and thus, growth (the eﬀect captured by σ in the last term), in line
with the empirical evidence (Blankenau et al., 2007). Capital income taxes η have an
ambiguous eﬀect on growth because they increase disposable income of workers but have
a negative eﬀect on their savings rate. If ε < 1, the economy does not grow endogenously
but converges to a steady state (unless B1 grows exogenously).
Irrespective of the value of ε, physical capital along its long-run growth path satisﬁes











(1 − α)(1 − τ − σ + φ(η)) z(τ,η)
s.t. (3).
We will use these relations for calibration purposes.
3 Politico-Economic Equilibrium
We assume that retirees, workers and students vote on candidates whose electoral plat-
forms specify values for the policy instruments, κt.10 Voters do not only support a can-
didate for her policy platform, but also for other characteristics like “ideology” that are
orthogonal to the fundamental policy dimensions of interest. These characteristics are
permanent and cannot be credibly altered in the course of electoral competition. More-
over, their valuation diﬀers across voters (even if voters agree about the preferred policy
platform) and is subject to random aggregate shocks, realized after candidates have cho-
sen their platforms. This “probabilistic-voting” setup renders the probability of winning
a voter’s support a continuous function of the competing policy platforms, implying that
equilibrium policy platforms smoothly respond to changes in the demographic structure.
This stands in sharp contrast to the “median-voter” setup where, in a model with only
a few generations, an inﬁnitesimal change in the demographic structure has implausibly
large eﬀects on policy outcomes if it alters the cohort the median voter is associated with.
In the Nash equilibrium of the game with two candidates choosing platforms to max-
imize their expected vote shares, both candidates propose the same policy platform.11
This platform maximizes a convex combination of the objective functions of all groups
of voters, where the weights reﬂect the groups’ size and sensitivity of voting behavior
to policy changes. Those groups that care the most about policy platforms rather than
other candidate characteristics are the most likely to shift their support from one candi-
date to the other in response to small changes in the proposed platforms. In equilibrium,
such groups of “swing voters” thus gain in political inﬂuence and tilt policy in their own
favor. If all voters are equally responsive to changes in the policy platforms, electoral
competition implements the utilitarian optimum with respect to voters.
10It is straightforward to analyze the situation where only a subset of all living agents participates in
the vote; see below.
11See Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) for discussions of probabilistic
voting.
10In the context of our model, the probabilistic-voting assumption implies that the
objective function maximized by the political process attaches weight to the welfare of all
currently living agents. In particular, it attaches positive weight to the welfare of retirees
even if these are outnumbered by workers and students. This implication is very realistic.
After all, old voters appear to exert as strong a political inﬂuence per capita as younger
voters when the salient issue of intergenerational transfers is at stake (see, for example,
Dixit and Londregan (1996, p. 1144) and Grossman and Helpman (1998, p. 1309)).
Owing to political competition at the beginning of each period, policy makers cannot
commit to future policy platforms. Voters therefore have to form expectations about the
eﬀect of current policy choices on future policy outcomes. Under the Markov assumption,
future leisure and policy choices are functions of the fundamental state variables only,
xt+1 = ˜ xt+1(Ht+1,qt+1) and κt+1 = ˜ κt+1(Ht+1,qt+1). (The state variables include demo-
graphic variables, thus the time indices of the policy functions.) If the policy functions
are independent of (H,q), κt+1 = ˜ κt+1, then (3) implies that the leisure function is in-
dependent of (H,q) as well, xt+1 = ˜ xt+1, and both the aggregate savings function and
the economic equilibrium conditions (2) apply (see the discussion at the end of subsec-
tion 2.3). In the following, we conjecture that the policy functions indeed are independent
of (H,q). We derive the equilibrium choice of policy instruments under this conjecture
and show that this choice does not depend on (H,q), thereby verifying the conjecture.
Letting ω and ψ denote the relative (to workers) per-capita political inﬂuence of re-
tirees and students, respectively, the program characterizing equilibrium policy choices in
period t is given by
max
κt
Wt(Ht,qt,κt; ˜ κt+1, ˜ xt+1) s.t. (1).
The political objective function Wt( ) depends on the endogenous state variables (as well
as the exogenous ones, thus the time index), the contemporaneous policy instruments,
and the anticipated values of policy instruments and leisure in the following period. In
particular,
Wt(Ht,qt,κt; ˜ κt+1, ˜ xt+1) ≡ ωpt ln(c2,t) + νt[ln(c1,t) + v(xt) + βpt+1 ln(c2,t+1)]
+ ψνtνt+1β[ln(c1,t+1) + v(xt+1) + βpt+2 ln(c2,t+2)]
s.t. (2),(3); Ht,qt given; κt+1 = ˜ κt+1, xt+1 = ˜ xt+1.
Political equilibrium requires that for any combination of state variables (Ht,qt), the κt
solving this program is given by ˜ κt.
Using the equilibrium expressions for consumption from (2), the objective function
11can be expressed as
Wt( ) = ωpt ln[(1 − xt)
1−α((1 − f + f/pt)(1 − ηt) + τt/(α
′pt))]
+ νt{ln[(1 − xt)
1−α(1 − τt − σt + φt(ηt))] +
v(xt) + βpt+1 ln[(1 − xt)




+ ψνtνt+1β{ln[(1 − xt)




βpt+2 ln[(1 − xt)





+ t.i.p. s.t. (3),
where t.i.p. denotes terms that are unaﬀected by contemporaneous policy choices (under
the conjecture). Notice that the contemporaneous policy instruments do not interact
with the state variables Ht or qt. This conﬁrms the conjecture that the equilibrium policy
functions are independent of these state variables.12 We ﬁrst consider the case with
inelastic labor supply.
3.1 Inelastic Labor Supply
If labor supply is inelastic then xt is ﬁxed such that
Wt( ) ≃ ωptln[((1 − f + f/pt)(1 − ηt) + τt/(α
′pt))] +












Disregarding the inequality constraints in (1), the eﬀects of marginal policy changes are
linearly dependent.13 We address this indeterminacy issue later. For now, we focus on
the equilibrium values for τt and σt conditional on a given choice of ηt.
Consider ﬁrst the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to σt:
1 + αβpt+1 + ψνt+1αβ[1 + βpt+2(δ(1 − α) + α)]
1 − τt − σt + φt(ηt)
=
βδ(1 − α)
pt+1 + ψνt+1[1 + βpt+2(ε(1 − δ) + δ(1 − α) + α)]
σt
.
The left-hand side of this equation reﬂects the marginal cost of an increase in σt. By
reducing disposable income of workers and depressing capital accumulation, an increase
in σt lowers workers’ second- and third-period consumption; the associated welfare eﬀects
12This result is due to the logarithmic preference assumption. However, we conjecture that the quan-
titative implications for equilibrium tax rates would be very similar if we generalized preferences to
the CRRA class, as is the case in a setup without human capital, education, or endogenous growth
(Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2005).
13In particular, ∂W/∂ηt = −α′pt(1 − f + f/pt)∂W/∂τt.
12are proportional to 1 + αβpt+1. Lower capital accumulation also hurts students whose
next-period labor income and savings falls, triggering (discounted) welfare losses that
are proportional to 1 + αβpt+2. Students additionally suﬀer from the fact that lower
output in period t+1 translates into reduced education investment and thus, lower output
and income in period t + 2; the corresponding welfare implications are proportional to
βpt+2δ(1 − α).
The right-hand side of the equality reﬂects the marginal beneﬁts of an increase in σt.
These beneﬁts work through higher productivity in the subsequent period as reﬂected
by the term βδ(1 − α). Workers beneﬁt because the productivity increase aﬀects all
their sources of income during retirement. Students beneﬁt from increased second- and
third-period consumption, both directly (the welfare eﬀect is proportional to 1+αβpt+2)
and indirectly, through induced education investment in period t + 1 (proportional to
βpt+2δ(1− α)) and due to the dynamic human capital externality that pays oﬀ in period
t + 2 (proportional to βpt+2ε(1 − δ)).
Conditional on ηt, this ﬁrst-order condition prescribes that τt and σt are negatively
related. Intuitively, a higher value of τt or σt reduces disposable incomes; this makes it
more costly to tax and therefore calls for a reduction of the other tax rate.
Consider next the choice of τt. Since the marginal cost of an increase in τt are the
same as those of an increase in σt (all terms in the objective function featuring −τt also
feature −σt), the marginal beneﬁts of increases in τt and σt must coincide in equilibrium.




αpt(1 − f + f/pt)(1 − ηt) + (1 − α)τt
=
βδ(1 − α)
pt+1 + ψνt+1[1 + βpt+2(ε(1 − δ) + δ(1 − α) + α)]
σt
,
where the left-hand side reﬂects the welfare eﬀect from increased consumption of retirees
due to higher retirement beneﬁts. Conditional on ηt, this second ﬁrst-order condition
deﬁnes a positive relationship between τt and σt. Intuitively, both retirement beneﬁts
(higher τt) and education investment (higher σt) have decreasing marginal beneﬁts, due
to the concavity of the beneﬁciaries’ utility function. To maintain equality of the two
marginal beneﬁts, an increase in τt therefore must be associated with an increase in σt.
Disregarding the inequality constraints in (1), we can solve the two ﬁrst-order condi-
tions for the equilibrium tax rates τW
t (ηt) and σW
t . (The resulting explicit solutions are
rather complicated and we omit them here.) Only the former of the two equilibrium tax
rates is conditional on the value of ηt. The equilibrium tax rate for transfers, τW
t (ηt),
increases in the relative per-capita weight of retirees in the political process, ω, and de-
creases in the relative per-capita weight of students, ψ. It also decreases in the size of the
younger cohorts, νt,νt+1, patience, β, the strength of the dynamic human capital exter-
nality, ε (as long as ψ > 0), and future longevity, pt+1,pt+2. The elasticity of τW
t (ηt) with
respect to contemporaneous longevity, pt, is positive for f suﬃciently close to unity, i.e.,
if accidental bequests are small. The tax rate funding education, σW
t , is strictly positive
and independent of the importance of accidental bequests, f. It increases in the number
and the relative political inﬂuence of those that care about the future, νt/pt,νt+1,ψ,ω−1,
13patience, β, the strength of the human capital externality, ε, and the longevity of students,
pt+2.
For any parameter constellation, the equilibrium tax rate σW
t and a continuum of
policies (τW
t (ηt),ηt) satisfy the constraints (1). This can be seen by noting that (i) σW
t
is always positive and (ii) τW
t
′(ηt) > 0 such that raising ηt allows to satisfy all non-
negativity constraints in (1). The indeterminacy with respect to ηt arises because ex post
(after savings have been chosen), labor and capital income taxes have exactly the opposite
eﬀect—only their diﬀerence, τW
t (ηt)−ηtα′pt(1−f +f/pt), aﬀects the allocation. Ex ante,
in contrast, the two tax rates have diﬀerent equilibrium implications because the capital
income tax rate aﬀects the savings rate (as long as τt+1  = 0).
We eliminate the policy indeterminacy by focusing on the policy that minimizes the
capital income tax rate, ηt, conditional on satisfying (1). This reﬁnement is motivated by
the observation that the minimal feasible capital income tax rate maximizes the economy’s
growth rate (if ε = 1) or capital-labor ratio and output (if ε < 1).14 The equilibrium tax



















t ( ) denoting the inverse of the function τW
t (ηt).
Subject to the reﬁnement, the equilibrium policy functions are unique in the limit of
the ﬁnite horizon economy. To see this, note that the consumption of workers and retirees
in the ﬁnal period, T, is given by
c1,T = LT(1 − τT + φT(ηT)),
c2,T = LT νTα
′
 





respectively. Tax rates are set to achieve ω =
c2,T
c1,T . Under the reﬁnement, this equation
has a unique solution with either τT or ηT equal to zero and the other tax rate weakly
positive; moreover, σT = 0. All three tax rates are independent of (HT,qT). Moving to
period T − 1, the policy functions for σT−1, τT−1, and ηT−1 therefore are independent of
(HT−1,qT−1) as well. The result then follows by induction.
3.2 Elastic Labor Supply
With elastic labor supply, xt depends on contemporaneous and future policy instruments.
As a consequence, the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to tax rates cease to be linearly
dependent and the equilibrium policy is determinate. At the same time, the ﬁrst-order
conditions do not generally admit closed-form solutions any longer. Recall from (3), how-
ever, that xt is independent of τt and σt if φt(ηt) = 0 (such that income and substitution
eﬀects cancel). In this case, the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to τt and σt remain
14The equilibrium value of τW
t (ηt)−ηtα′pt(1−f +f/pt) does not vary with ηt. As a consequence, the
capital income tax rate aﬀects growth or output only through the savings rate z( ), see equation (5) for
the case ε = 1.
14unchanged relative to the case with inelastic labor supply. As a consequence, the equilib-
rium tax rates in the case with inelastic labor supply, κW
t , also constitute the equilibrium
tax rates in the case with elastic labor supply, and the endogenous nature of labor supply
provides another rationale for the reﬁnement we adopted in the case with inelastic labor
supply.
Independently of φt(ηt), the equilibrium policy functions are unique in the limit of the
ﬁnite horizon economy.
3.3 Eﬃciency
Before turning to the quantitative predictions of the model, we brieﬂy discuss some of
its normative implications. We start by comparing the politico-economic equilibrium to
the allocation implemented by a Ramsey planner who—in contrast to political decision
makers—can commit to future policy choices and attaches weight to the welfare of cur-
rently living and yet unborn generations. Denoting the intergenerational discount factor














s−t(βps ln(c2,s) + ρln(c1,s) + ρv(xs))
s.t. (2),(3) for all s ≥ t; Ht,qt given.
We discuss the solution to this program in Appendix A.
The equilibrium conditions in (2) imply that two allocations necessarily diﬀer unless
they are supported by the same tax sequences. As a consequence, the politico-economic
equilibrium can only be supported by a Ramsey policy subject to intergenerational dis-
count factor ρ if this policy speciﬁes tax rates as time-invariant functions of the demo-
graphic structure. This is generally not the case since, as we discuss in Appendix A,
the Ramsey policy generally is not time consistent. Even if the Ramsey policy is time
consistent, the politico-economic equilibrium allocation coincides with the allocation im-
plemented by a Ramsey planner only for a unique pair of political weights, (ˆ ω, ˆ ψ)(ρ)
say. The politico-economic equilibrium therefore generically diﬀers from the allocation
implemented by a Ramsey planner.
If the politico-economic equilibrium diﬀers from the Ramsey equilibrium, is the former
at least consumption and production eﬃcient? Or does the politico-economic equilibrium
allow for a change in consumption or investment patterns that leaves all current and
future cohorts better oﬀ? We now turn to this question.
Assessing consumption eﬃciency of the equilibrium allocation is straightforward. The
politico-economic equilibrium is consumption ineﬃcient if reallocating consumption from
15Since the Ramsey planner can commit, “non-geometric” welfare weights would imply that the econ-
omy embarks on an unbalanced growth path, even in a stationary environment. We dismiss this possibility.
15workers to retirees leads to a Pareto improvement. Clearly, retirees in the initial cohort
beneﬁt from such a consumption reallocation. Members of some later cohort i,i > t,
beneﬁt as well if βγHνi+1u′(c2,i+1) ≥ u′(c1,i). Using the households’ consumption Euler
equation, the condition for consumption eﬃciency along a balanced growth path can thus





To assess production eﬃciency, we consider a sequence of changes in human and phys-
ical capital investment along a balanced growth path that leaves total investment in each
period unchanged. We then check whether such a reallocation of investment spending
weakly increases output in all future periods. If this is the case, the initial allocation
is production ineﬃcient (see Cass, 1972). In Appendix B, we derive as a criterion for








σ(1 − ε(1 − δ))
.
4 Quantitative Implications
We now turn to a quantitative assessment of our framework. We calibrate the model
to match stylized features of the U.S. economy, in particular the GDP shares ﬂowing
into retirement beneﬁts on the one hand and public education on the other. We then
analyze how the forecasted changes in the demographic structure aﬀect equilibrium tax
rates, budget shares and per-capita growth. We also compare the politico-economic equi-
librium along a balanced growth path with the corresponding Ramsey allocation (under
the assumption that ρ = βν) and assess consumption and production eﬃciency of the
equilibrium. One period in the model corresponds to 25 years in the data.
Using NIPA data, Piketty and Saez (2003) compute a time series for the capital
share in post-war U.S. data. We use the average of that series for the period 1970–2003:
α = 0.2815. In the model, the elasticity of earnings with respect to education spending
equals δ (holding aggregate human capital and labor supply ﬁxed).16 Card and Krueger
(1995) and Betts (1996) report various estimates of this elasticity, ranging from close to
zero up to 0.55. We use δ = 0.12, the median of the more recent estimates reported by
both Card and Krueger (1995) and Betts (1996) as our baseline value, but also consider
δ = 0.155, the value Card and Krueger (1995) infer from their own earlier work, as a
robustness check. Without loss of generality, we normalize B0 = 1. In the baseline
calibration, we assume ε = 1 (endogenous growth).




ht(1 − xt) = (1 − α)B0sα
t−1[Htν(1 − xt)]−αht(1 − xt) s.t. ht = B1,tH
ε(1−δ)
t−1 (νtνt+1it−1)δ.
16To calibrate β, ω, ψ and f, we match four empirical moments.17 In particular, we
impose that the model-predicted GDP shares of retirement beneﬁts and education spend-
ing,
share of net transfers to retirees = sh
R
t ≡ (1 − α)(τt − ηtα
′pt(1 − f + f/pt)),
education share = sh
I
t ≡ (1 − α)σt,
respectively, match their empirical counterparts in the years 1975 (sh
R





t).18 Moreover, we impose that the model’s interest rate along the balanced-
growth-path, R, matches the data, conditional on the observed long-run growth rate
(corresponding to γH in the model).19
Finally, we associate νt and pt with data about population growth and life expectancy
at retirement age. In particular, we associate νt with the gross population growth rate of







Using data from the 2007 OASDI Trustees Report20 (Table V.A2, estimates and projec-
tions, middle series), we compute νt for the years t = 1975,1980,...,2085. From the same
source (Table V.A4, intermediate), we compute pt as the average Cohort Life Expectancy
at Age 65, normalized by the period length of 25 years.21 For example, for the year 2000,
this procedure yields νt = ν2000 = 1.2562, νt+1 = ν2025 = 1.1438, pt = p2000 = 0.7220, and
pt+1 = p2025 = 0.7110. Figure 1 displays the time series for νt and pt. Based on these
series and the calibrated parameters, the model generates ﬁve overlapping sequences of
predictions for the endogenous variables, each with a step size of 25 years. The ﬁrst such
sequence covers the years 1975, 2000, 2025, ...; the second one the years 1980, 2005,
17There is no need to calibrate the parameter ˜ B1 for the analysis of the transition dynamics. The
parameter will be calibrated for the analysis of the balanced growth path.
18The empirical shares (we use 5-year centered averages, except for the year 2005) are given by
sh
R
1975 = 0.0492, sh
R
2005 = 0.0682, and sh
I
2005 = 0.0533. Retirement beneﬁts are taken from
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/table4a4.html (social security and medicare), education expendi-
tures from http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb (investment plus current expenditure).
19Campbell and Viceira (2005) report annualized gross returns for 90-day treasury-bills (1.0152), 5-
year treasury-bonds (1.0289), and stocks (1.0783) for the period 1952–2002. We approximate the average
return on savings by a weighted average of these returns (1.0483) where the weights are proportional to
the relative size of “deposits”, “credit market instruments”, and “equity shares at market value, directly
held plus indirectly held” in the balance sheets of households and non-proﬁt organizations (Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States: Annual Flows
and Outstandings, several years; we use averages for the period 1955–2002).
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, multifactor productivity of private businesses grew by a
factor of 1.8681 between 1952 and 2002 (http://www.bls.gov/mfp/home.htm, series MPU740023 (K)),
or by an annual factor of 1.0126.
20See http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR07/V demographic.html.
21We adjust the projected life expectancy progressively by up to two years in order
to account for the foreseen increase of the retirement age over the next decades, see
http://ssa.gov/pubs/retirechart.htm. Due to data limitations, we do not correct the population
growth series in the same manner.








Figure 1: νt (⋄) and pt (⋆)
2030, ...; etc. When reporting model predictions about transition dynamics, we merge
the ﬁve sequences.22
We compute the predictions for the transition dynamics under the assumption of
inelastic labor supply, ﬁxing xt at the value 2/3. Table 1 summarizes the baseline cali-
bration. Notice that both relative political weights, ω and ψ, are calibrated to be close
to unity. Our quantitative results therefore do not hinge on the presumption that some
groups are much more inﬂuential in the political process than others. Notice also that
f is calibrated to be close to zero, suggesting a low degree of annuitization (in line with
empirical evidence) and a strong role for accidental bequests.23 Due to these acciden-
tal bequests, an increase in life expectancy (p) has a negative income eﬀect on workers
(as they receive fewer bequests). By partly compensating for the increasing number and
therefore, voice of retirees, this eﬀect slows down the rise of τt.
Table 1: Baseline Calibration
Exogenous parameters: α = 0.2815, δ = 0.1200, B0 = 1, ε = 1
Implied parameters: β = 0.5956, ω = 0.9273, ψ = 0.7351, f = 0.0638
Notes: See explanations in the text. On an annual basis, β equals 0.9795.










22To compute model predictions up to the year 2075, we need population growth predictions until 2125
and predictions for life expectancy until 2150. Since projections for population growth and life expectancy
are available up to the year 2085 only, we assume that the two demographic series remain constant after
that year.
23See Davidoﬀ, Brown and Diamond (2003) for possible explanations of the low degree of annuitization
observed in the data.











t : Model predictions (⋄) and data (⋆)











t: Model predictions (⋄) and data (⋆)
does a good job at capturing the observed slowdown of the transfer share in the 1990s. As
far as public eduction is concerned, conditional on the (matched) value of sh
I
2005, the model
captures the observed trend decline in the share, but not the more short run ﬂuctuations.
Turning to the out-of-sample forecasts, the model predicts the demographic transition to
have a negative eﬀect on investment and a large, positive eﬀect on beneﬁts. In particular,
it predicts the GDP share of retirement beneﬁts to rise by 53 percent between the years
2005 and 2075, the share of education spending to decrease by 5 percent over the same
period, and the GDP share of both government spending components to rise by 28 percent.
Since the tax rate ηt remains zero throughout the sample period, the tax rates τt and σt





These predictions are robust to changes in parameters and empirical moments used to
calibrate the model, see Table 2. In particular, the predicted eﬀect of the demographic
transition on the two budget shares remains essentially unchanged if ε is reduced below
24The implied tax rates for the year 2005 are τ2005 = 0.0949, σ2005 = 0.0742, and η2005 = 0.
19unity such that the economy displays exogenous rather than endogenous growth. While
the reduction in ε goes hand in hand with a change in ψ, to match the levels of the budget
shares, the elasticities of the budget shares with respect to demographic change are essen-
tially unaﬀected. This ﬁnding is intuitive. After all, the political process only internalizes
the short-term repercussions of policy on output, and these short-term repercussions are
not strongly aﬀected by the dynamic human capital externality.
Table 2: Robustness Checks





0.5 0.155 1.04 1.05 1.01 1.02
Implied Parameter Values
β 0.5956 0.5957 0.5953 0.7749 0.5656 0.5489 0.7574
ω 0.9273 0.9418 0.8960 0.9393 0.9255 0.9246 0.9380
ψ 0.7351 0.8703 0.4373 0.4270 0.8103 0.8565 0.4493
Implied Budget Shares in the Year 2075
sh
R
2075 0.1044 0.1041 0.1050 0.1039 0.1045 0.1046 0.1040
sh
I
2075 0.0508 0.0506 0.0516 0.0515 0.0507 0.0506 0.0514
Note: See explanations in the text.
Figure 4 shows that fertility rather than longevity is the driving force behind the rising
GDP share of retirement beneﬁts. The ﬁgure displays the evolution of sh
R
t in the baseline
scenario and under the assumption that either νt or pt remains constant from the year
2010 onwards. Fixing population growth (that is, keeping the ratio of students to workers
higher than projected) implies a strong reduction of sh
R
t relative to the baseline, while
ﬁxing life expectancy (that is, keeping life expectancy lower than projected) has a small
positive eﬀect on the beneﬁt share, because of higher bequests.25 For the GDP share of
public education spending, the eﬀects are smaller and have the reverse sign, see Figure 5.
Next, we turn to the long-run growth implications of the projected demographic
change, assuming that ε = 1. We consider the case with elastic labor supply, since
25Olshansky, Passaro, Hershow, Layden, Carnes, Brody, Hayﬂick, Butler, Allison and Ludwig (2005,
p. 1138) argue that, due to obesity, “the steady rise in life expectancy during the past two centuries may
soon come to an end.” Before that background, the constant-p case may not only be interpreted as an
analytical device, but also as a plausible scenario.










t : Baseline scenario (⋄), constant νt after 2010 (⋆), constant pt after 2010
(2)











t: Baseline scenario (⋄), constant νt after 2010 (⋆), constant pt after 2010 (2)
21even small changes in labor supply may have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the growth rate. The
calibration of the model now proceeds under the assumption that the economy grows
along a balanced growth path in the year 2005, the 2005-BGP say. There are ﬁve changes
relative to the calibration strategy described before. First, we assume v(x) ≡ mln(x) and
calibrate m by imposing that x2005 = 2/3. Second, we calibrate B1,2005 under the assump-
tion that γH as given in (5) equals the observed long-run growth rate of 1.012625 ≈ 1.3676.
Third, in order to match the GDP shares of public education and social security bene-
ﬁts, we evaluate the expressions for the shares at the numerical solutions for tax rates
under the assumption of elastic labor supply, rather than the closed-form solutions under
the assumption of inelastic labor supply, κt. Fourth, we match the GDP shares in the
year 2005 only. Rather than also matching sh
R
1975 (as we did before), we ﬁx f at the
value calibrated before.26 Finally, we impose that all demographic variables remain con-
stant at their year-2005 values. Table 3 summarizes the results of the calibration. The
corresponding allocation is production and consumption eﬃcient.
Table 3: Calibration for BGP, elastic labor
Exogenous parameters: α = 0.2815, δ = 0.1200, B0 = 1, ε = 1, f = 0.0638
Implied parameters: β = 0.5265, ω = 0.9474, ψ = 0.8326,
m = 2.3066, B1,2005 = 2.5611
Notes: See explanations in the text. On an annual basis, β equals 0.9747.
Conditional on this calibration consistent with the 2005-BGP, we derive predictions
for the balanced growth path at the end of the century, the 2075-BGP say, under the
assumption that the two demographic variables ν and p permanently change to their
projected values in the year 2075. The resulting new allocation remains production and
consumption eﬃcient, but other features of the balanced growth path change. In par-
ticular, the GDP share of social security rises from 6.8 percent to over 11 percent, and
the GDP share of public education falls from 5.3 to 4.7 percent. Correspondingly, the
social-security tax rate τ rises and the tax rate funding public education, σ, falls (tax
rate η remains zero). Note that the predicted budget shares along the 2075-BGP and
the budget shares predicted to prevail at the end of the transition dynamics are close to
each other. Since only the former are computed under the assumption of elastic labor
supply, we conclude that the transition dynamics analysis is robust to endogenizing the
labor-leisure tradeoﬀ.
In spite of the higher labor income tax rate along the 2075-BGP, labor supply 1 − x
is predicted to rise by about 2.7 percent, due to a negative wealth eﬀect from fewer
accidental bequests and a higher savings rate; both these eﬀects originate in the higher
26The results do not hinge on this assumption. The growth implications of the demographic transition
are nearly unchanged if f is ﬁxed at diﬀerent values, 0 or 0.3 say.
22life expectancy, see equation (3). This prediction of increased hours per worker runs
counter to the fear, expressed in the policy debate, that higher Social Security taxes would
be associated with depressed labor supply. The model therefore does not only highlight
the dangers of a partial equilibrium analysis, but also the importance of diﬀerentiating
between changes in fertility (driving tax rates) and longevity (driving labor supply) when
considering the implications of demographic ageing.
The eﬀect of these changes on the growth rate depends on the extent to which human-
capital accumulation is rival (see the discussion on page 6). If human-capital accumu-
lation is non-rival such that B1,t is independent of demographics, productivity growth
on the new balanced growth path increases slightly, to 1.3857. This corresponds to an
annual productivity growth rate of 1.31 percent, compared with 1.26 percent along the
2005-BGP. Reduced capital dilution is at the source of this acceleration of productivity
growth: Holding the economy’s investment rate constant, the slowdown in population
growth allows for faster capital accumulation per worker and thus, stronger growth. But
this positive eﬀect on productivity is partly undone by the negative consequences of the
reallocation of government spending. If tax rates and spending shares were held constant
at their 2005-BGP values, growth would accelerate even faster, to 1.4208 or 1.41 percent
annually. Two thirds (10 basis points) of the potential gain in productivity growth due
to reduced capital dilution (15 basis points) are therefore undone because the political
process shifts resources from education to transfers.
If human-capital accumulation is rival, in contrast, B1,t increases as a consequence of
the fall in population growth, resulting in signiﬁcant physical and human capital deepening
and a surge of productivity growth to around 1.9 percent annually. But the “growth
cost” due to the reallocation of government spending remains roughly unchanged: If
policy instruments were ﬁxed at their 2005-BGP values, the annual growth rate would
accelerate by 10 basis points more.
It is also instructive to compare the equilibrium allocation with the allocation sup-
ported by the Ramsey policy subject to ρ = βν, corresponding to a situation where all
current and future generations vote once and for all. We consider both the case with
endogenous growth and with exogenous growth. In parallel with the procedure explained
earlier, we let ε = 1.0 or ε = 0.5 (endogenous or exogenous growth, respectively) and cal-
ibrate the remaining model parameters such that the politico-economic equilibrium along
the 2005-BGP matches the targeted budget shares, interest rate, growth rate, and labor
supply. For each of the two sets of parameters, we then compute the Ramsey policy.
With endogenous growth, the Ramsey policy features a much higher budget share for
education, sh
I = 0.1536 (compared with 0.0533 in politico-economic equilibrium or in
the data), and no retirement beneﬁts at all, sh
R = 0 (compared with 0.0682). Although
the labor income tax rate under the Ramsey policy is higher than in politico-economic
equilibrium, growth is substantially stronger under the Ramsey policy (1.80 rather than
1.26 percent per year). This increase in the productivity growth rate is caused by higher
labor supply (0.3478), an increased savings rate (due to reduced retirement beneﬁts), and
the much higher education spending.
With exogenous growth, the case for public investment spending becomes weaker.
The Ramsey policy therefore reduces spending for public education to sh
I = 0.0936 but
23maintains zero retirement beneﬁts. These budget shares continue to be higher and lower,
respectively, than the corresponding shares in politico-economic equilibrium.
5 Conclusion
What are the demographic and political factors that shape government budgets? And how
does the structure of government budgets aﬀect macroeconomic aggregates? The model
presented in this paper proposes a rich, yet tractable framework to answer these questions.
Building on a standard overlapping generations model, it endogenizes both economic and
political choices, generating predictions for consumption, labor supply, labor- and capital-
income taxes, pensions, human and physical capital accumulation as well as productivity
growth.
We apply the model to study the eﬀects of the projected trend decrease in fertility
combined with the trend increase in longevity in the United States. Several robust pre-
dictions emerge. Most importantly, the projected demographic transition, in particular
the decrease in fertility, triggers a reallocation of government spending from productive
public education to unproductive intergenerational transfers. Labor income taxes and
hours worked per capita rise, the latter because upward pressure on labor supply due to
rising longevity more than outweighs the negative eﬀect from tax distortions. The reallo-
cation of government spending triggers a decrease of per-capita growth (if human capital
externalities are suﬃciently strong to sustain endogenous growth) or per-capita income (if
they are not). In the former case, the decrease in annual productivity growth relative to
a scenario without any changes to policy equals roughly ten basis points, independently
of the extent to which human capital accumulation is rival.
These ﬁndings do not only undermine the notion among many policy makers that the
political process will implement measures to boost productivity in order to “outgrow” the
burden imposed by population ageing. A comparison between the politico-economic equi-
librium and the allocation implemented by a Ramsey planner also suggests that limited
political participation causes potentially severe losses if measured by a utilitarian social
welfare function that accounts for all current and future generations. At the source of
these losses is the fact that political decision makers optimize over a short horizon and
therefore tend to invest too little, in particular if the dynamic human capital externality is
strong. As noted in the introduction, this underinvestment problem cannot be overcome
by letting voters ﬁnance investment expenditures out of government debt. The balanced-
budget assumption maintained throughout the analysis therefore is not restrictive.
We have assumed that human capital production does not employ labor. While this
assumption is useful for our purposes, one might want to relax it in order to analyze
other issues, for example the reallocation of labor in response to population ageing or the
eﬀect of interest groups in the public education sector. We leave such an analysis with
“teachers” for future research.
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26A Ramsey Program
Denoting a typical term in the objective function of the Ramsey planner by πs, we have
πs ≡ βps ln(c2,s) + ρln(c1,s) + ρv(xs) s.t. (2),(3)
= βps ln[qs(1 − xs)
1−α((1 − f + f/ps)(1 − ηs) + τs/(α
′ps))] +
ρln[qs(1 − xs)
1−α(1 − τs − σs + φs(ηs))(1 − zs+1(τs+1,ηs+1))] +
ρv(xs) + terms independent of policy s.t. (3)
= ln(qs)(βps + ρ) + ln(1 − xs)(1 − α)(βps + ρ) + ρv(xs) +
βps ln((1 − f + f/ps)(1 − ηs) + τs/(α
′ps)) + ρln(1 − τs − σs + φs(ηs)) +
ρln(1 − zs+1(τs+1,ηs+1)) + terms independent of policy s.t. (3).
Since we focus on the Ramsey policy along a balanced growth path, we assume that ps = p
for all s ≥ t.
Consider the direct and indirect eﬀects (the latter working through induced changes
in qs) on the objective function that are triggered by a marginal change of one of the

























where the second and fourth lines only apply if i > t as they capture eﬀects of ϕi on
household choices in the preceding period, i − 1.27
27Using (3), the terms in the ﬁrst and second line can be simpliﬁed. In particular,
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where matrices with a negative exponent are zero by convention. The term ∂mi−1/∂ϕi
only applies if i > t. We ﬁrst consider the case with inelastic labor supply.
A.1 Inelastic Labor Supply
Similarly to the situation in politico-economic equilibrium, the eﬀects of policy changes in
period t are linearly dependent.28 Conditional on a choice for ηt, the optimality conditions
for τt and σt can be rearranged as
1 + Ω22α
1 − τt − σt + φ(ηt)
=






αpt(1 − f + f/pt)(1 − ηt) + (1 − α)τt
=
δ(Ω21 + Ω22(1 − α))
σt
.
In parallel with the politico-economic equilibrium conditions discussed earlier, these con-
ditions require the cost and beneﬁts of a marginal increase of σt to be equal to each other,
and the beneﬁts of marginal increases of τt and σt to be equalized, respectively. The terms
Ω21 ≡ (βp + ρ)[(I − ρM)−1][2,1] and Ω22 ≡ (βp + ρ)[(I − ρM)−1][2,2] measure the present
discounted contribution to the planner’s objective of an increase in the (logarithm of the)
economy’s stock of human capital and q, respectively.
Consider the ﬁrst equation. There are two, intuitive diﬀerences between this condition
and the corresponding condition that holds in politico-economic equilibrium: First, on the
left- and right-hand side, the term Ω22 replaces the expression β(p+ψνt+1[1+βp(δ(1−α)+
α)]). This is due to the fact that the planner internalizes the eﬀect of capital accumulation
on all future cohorts rather than tomorrow’s retirees and workers only. Second, on the
right-hand side, the term Ω21 replaces the expression ψνt+1β2(1 − α)pε(1 − δ), again
reﬂecting the Ramsey planner’s concern for all future cohorts as higher investment in
education aﬀects Ht+s and qt+s, s ≥ 1. On the left-hand side of the second equation, the
only diﬀerence to the politico-economic equilibrium is that the political weight of retirees
relative to workers, ωp/νt, is replaced by their relative weight as attached by the planner,
βp/ρ.
28In particular, ∂Gt( )/∂ηt = −α′pt(1 − f + f/pt)∂Gt( )/∂τt.
28Changes in the population growth rate leave the Ramsey tax rates unaﬀected, in
contrast to the situation in politico-economic equilibrium where changes in νt aﬀect the
relative weights attached to the constituencies and thus, equilibrium tax rates.29 Disre-
garding the inequality constraints (1) and solving the ﬁrst-order conditions for a given ηt




βp(1 − δρ − (1 − δ)ρ(α + ε(1 − αρ)))
(1 − α)(βp + ρ)(1 − (1 − δ)ερ)
− α





1 − (1 − δ)ερ
> 0.
Conditional on ηt, the tax rate τG
t decreases with the strength of the human capital
externality, ε, while the tax rate σG
t increases with it.
For any parameter constellation, the Ramsey tax rate σG
t and a continuum of policies
(τG
t (ηt),ηt) satisfy the constraints (1) (because σG
t is positive and τG
t
′(ηt) > 0). The source
of this indeterminacy is the same as in politico-economic equilibrium: Once savings choices
have been made, labor and capital income taxes have exactly opposite eﬀects. Focusing




















t ( ) denoting the inverse of the function τG
t (ηt).
Turning to the Ramsey planner’s choice of κG
i , i > t, both τi and ηi aﬀect the savings
decision in period i−1. As a consequence, no indeterminacy with respect to future policy
instruments arises. The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to τi and ηi, respectively,
























These terms reﬂect the fact that induced changes in the preceding period’s savings rate
aﬀect the planner’s objective both directly (altered consumption of workers, see the left-
hand side term in the brackets) and indirectly (implications of altered capital accumula-
tion, see the right-hand side term in the brackets). If
zt(τt,ηt)
1−zt(τt,ηt) = Ω22α when evaluated
at the optimal period-t tax rates, then the direct and indirect feedback eﬀects cancel,
implying that the optimal tax rates in period t are also optimal in all subsequent periods.
If ηt = 0 and f = 1, then it is indeed the case that
zt(τt,ηt)
1−zt(τt,ηt) = Ω22α when evaluated at
the optimal period-t tax rates. To understand this result, note ﬁrst that ηt = 0 and f = 1
in combination with time-invariant tax rates (at the period-t optimal values) implies that
the consumption ratio c1,i/c2,i equals ρ/(βνi) for all i ≥ t (see (2)); that is, the Ramsey
planner achieves the same consumption ratio as a social planner that is not constrained
29Both Ω21 and Ω22 are independent of ν.
29by the implementability constraints.30 Second, if capital income remains untaxed (ηi = 0
for all i ≥ t) and (surviving) retirees receive the full return to capital (f = 1), then house-
holds’ privately optimal savings choice conforms with the planner’s preferred savings level
(conditional on the planner’s preferred level of human capital accumulation). The im-
plementability constraints therefore are non-binding and the Ramsey planner implements
the same allocation as a social planner that is only constrained by the resource constraint.
But such a social-planner allocation is necessarily time consistent.
If τG
t = 0 and ηG
t > 0, direct and indirect feedback eﬀects do not cancel. Nevertheless,
the Ramsey policy continues to be time-consistent under certain conditions. To see this,
note that ∂zi(0,ηi)/∂ηi = 0. The potential source of time-inconsistency therefore disap-
pears as far as the choice of ηi is concerned. Moreover, the corner solution for τG
t implies
a corner solution for τG















If this inequality is violated, then the social beneﬁt of higher savings by workers in the
preceding period falls short of the beneﬁt of higher consumption by workers in the pre-
ceding period. The Ramsey planner therefore prefers strictly positive intergenerational
transfers ex-ante, but no such transfers ex post.
A.2 Elastic Labor Supply
With elastic labor supply, changes in tax rates work through four additional channels: In
period t, they (i) aﬀect production as well as the utility from leisure in period t and (ii)
have indirect eﬀects through induced changes in the state variables in periods t + 1 and
later. In periods i > t, they (iii) also aﬀect production and the utility from leisure in
period i − 1 and (iv) have indirect eﬀects through induced changes in the state variables
in periods i and later. The optimal tax rates in the initial period t are determinate, due
to the presence of the marginal eﬀects on labor supply.
The resulting system of optimality conditions does not generally allow for closed-form
solutions. Suppose that f = 1 and the Ramsey tax rates satisfy ηi = 0 for all i ≥ t. In this
case, ∂xt/∂τt = ∂xt/∂σt = 0 (see (3)), implying that the ﬁrst-order conditions for τt and
σt are unchanged relative to the case with inelastic labor supply. Since ∂z(τ,η)/∂τ < 0,
an increase in τi,i > t, depresses labor supply in period i−1 (see (3)). Relative to the case
with inelastic labor supply, this introduces additional, negative terms in the ﬁrst-order
conditions with respect to τi,i > t. When τt is strictly positive, we therefore have τt > τi.
With τt  = τi, σt diﬀers from σi as well. If τi = 0, a closed-form solution for σi results.
30The social planner equalizes the marginal rate of substitution between consumption of retirees and
workers, (β/c2,i)/(ρ/c1,i), and the corresponding marginal rate of transformation, 1/νi.
30B Production Eﬃciency
Consider a path with constant ν and p and let y denote output per worker. Conditional
on Ht and labor supply, we have




j ln(It+i−j), i ≥ 0.
Starting from the investment policy {kt+i+1,It+i}∞
i=0, consider a sequence of small real-
locations of investment spending between physical and human capital investment. This
sequence involves, in each period i, a small change in human capital investment of ∆i
(per student in period i), and a corresponding change in physical capital investment of
−∆i (per worker in period i + 1). If this policy change weakly increases output in all
subsequent periods, then it amounts to a Pareto improvement and the initial allocation


















jǫt+i−j ≥ 0 for all i ≥ 0,
where we deﬁne ǫt+i ≡ ∆t+i/It+i, and where at least one inequality must hold strictly.




+ δ(1 − α)
is time-invariant. The conditions for production ineﬃciency can therefore be summarized
as
aǫt ≥ 0,




jǫt+i−j ≥ 0 for all i ≥ 1,
where at least one inequality must hold strictly.
Intuitively, the term a (multiplied by the amount of physical capital investment) repre-
sents the eﬀect of an inﬁnitesimal reallocation from physical to human capital investment
on output in the subsequent period. To increase output in period t + 1, ǫt must have the
same sign as a. To increase output in periods later than period t+1, the combined eﬀect
of the lagged changes in physical and human capital investment must be positive.
When a > 0, physical capital is over accumulated in the initial allocation. As is
apparent from the above conditions, one can generate a Pareto improvement in this case
by reallocating resources from physical to human capital (corresponding to ǫt+i > 0). Over
accumulation of physical capital is also present if a = 0 and ε(1 − δ) > 0, corresponding
31to the allocation in an economy without government intervention, but with markets for
private education ﬁnancing (see Boldrin and Montes (2005) and Docquier, Paddison and
Pestieau (2007) for a characterization of this economy). In such a complete markets
setting, savings is allocated across human and physical capital investment in such a way
that output in the subsequent period cannot be increased. However, if ε(1 − δ) > 0, the
stock of human capital contributes to future human capital accumulation, and a slight
reallocation from physical to human capital investment therefore increases output in all
later periods, as is apparent from the above conditions. The complete markets allocation
(a = 0) is not Pareto optimal in this case because it does not properly account for the
dynamic human capital externality.
When a is negative and large in absolute value, the allocation again is production
ineﬃcient. In this case, a reallocation of resources from human to physical capital ac-
cumulation (corresponding to ǫt+i < 0) generates a Pareto improvement. For exam-
ple, if a = −1, a sequence of ǫt+i = ǫ < 0 for all i ≥ 0 increases production in all
future periods because the positive eﬀect from additional physical capital investment,
aǫ = −ǫ > 0, dominates the cumulative negative eﬀect from reduced human capital ac-
cumulation, δ(1 − α)
 i
j=1(ε(1 − δ))jǫ < ǫ. To characterize the largest a < 0 allowing
for a persistent increase in output, we consider a sequence {ǫ⋆
t+i}∞
i=0 with ǫ⋆
t < 0 where
{ǫ⋆
t+i}∞
i=1 is recursively deﬁned by the requirement that dln(yt+i) = 0 for all i ≥ 2. If
such a sequence is bounded then production is ineﬃcient. For i ≥ 1, the terms of such a
sequence satisfy aǫ⋆
t+i + δ(1 − α)
 i
j=1(ε(1 − δ))jǫ⋆
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t+i−1, i > 1.




















. The criterion for
production eﬃciency (if ε(1−δ) > 0 such that a = 0 is not eﬃcient), −
(1−α)εδ(1−δ)









σ(1 − ε(1 − δ))
.
33